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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For many years environmental regulators have relied upon various forms of taxes,
subsidies and command and control regulations to remedy environmental prob-
lems. Recently, however, a new tool has been added to the regulator’s tool box,
namely voluntary environmental agreements. Because voluntary agreements
have arisen quite recently, and because they have been developed by practition-
ers rather than academics, their properties are less well understood than those
of the standard regulatory tools. This chapter describes a model in which regu-
lation and public voluntary agreements can be considered in a uniﬁed political
economic framework, thereby allowing a sharper comparison of their relative
merits.
The literature on unilateral corporate voluntary environmental actions sug-
gests that the preemption of stricter future regulations is a leading motivation
for such actions.1 This motivation has also been used to explain corporate
participation in voluntary environmental agreements between corporations and
environmental regulators.2 In the case of public voluntary or negotiated agree-
ments, the desire to preempt has also been ascribed to the environmental regu-
lator, who may wish to preempt future regulations if voluntary actions represent
a cheaper way of achieving environmental goals. While preemption may indeed
explain the adoption of some voluntary agreements, it is not uncommon to ﬁnd
public voluntary environmental agreements in the absence of strong regulatory
threats. In fact the U.S. EPA notes “Governments promote voluntary initiatives
for a variety of reasons, including the pilot testing of new approaches and the
absence of legislative authority to establish mandatory programs.”3 If voluntary
1See Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) and Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell (2000) for models
in which industries or ﬁrms undertake unilateral actions aimed at preempting or weakening
future regulations.
2See Segerson and Miceli (1998) and Hansen (1999) for models in which ﬁrms and regulators
enter into voluntary agreements so as to preempt legislation dictating traditional regulations.
We discuss these papers and their relation to the present paper in more detail in section 2.
3U.S. EPA (2001) p. 173, emphasis added.
1environmental agreements are not designed to preempt legislation, what then is
motivating ﬁrm and regulatory adoption of these agreements, and what are the
impacts of such agreements on social welfare? This paper attempts to answer
these questions.
Our analysis is built around a two-stage game which features the possibility
of a voluntary environmental agreement if legislative eﬀorts are bypassed or are
attempted but fail. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the regulator chooses whether
to propose new legislation that would impose a pollution tax.4 If the proposal
is made, it is put to Congress and passes with some probability less than one. If
legislation is successful, the regulator imposes a constrained welfare-maximizing
pollution tax. Plant owners now decide either to adopt an abatement technology
and avoid paying the tax, or not to abate and thereby incur the tax. If legislative
eﬀorts fail, or if the regulator chooses not to pursue them, then the regulator
has the option of proposing a voluntary agreement, which is implemented by
subsidizing technology adoptions through the use of costly public funds. The
level of subsidies is set so as to maximize social welfare.
Our analysis generates both positive and normative implications. We exam-
ine the relative merits of taxation and voluntary agreements from the regulator’s
perspective; in particular, we show that the regulator is better oﬀ imposing a
tax rather than a VA unless political opposition to the tax is high. The chief
normative ﬁnding is surprising: public VAs can reduce welfare by increasing
industry resistance to socially beneﬁcial tax proposals. We go on to apply our
analysis to recent U.S. climate change policy, focusing on President Clinton’s
Climate Change Action Plan and President George W. Bush’s eﬀorts to develop
a system of credit for early reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.
The following section provides a brief review of recent theoretical models of
voluntary agreements, and section 3 presents an overview of our modeling ap-
proach. Section 4 discusses the regulator’s choice between proposing a tax and
proposing a public voluntary agreement. Section 5 applies our analytical frame-
work to the Clinton and Bush Administration’s proposals on climate change,
and section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications.
2 Economic Models of Voluntary Agreements
Our model is part of a small theoretical literature that aims to illuminate the
fundamental features of voluntary environmental initiatives. Most of the papers
in this literature make use of multistage games of complete information. The
diﬀerences between them revolve around the set of options for industry and for
the regulator that are considered in the models, the dynamic structure of the
models, and the assumptions made about the structure and operation of the
political process.
4In order to economize on the number of agents in the model, we treat the regulator as
a part of the executive branch of government and empower it to make tax proposals to the
legislature.
2Self-Regulation Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) present a model of
industry self-regulation, in which unilateral industry action can preempt cit-
izen/consumers from organizing to lobby for tougher regulations. The pa-
per shows that preemption improves social welfare even when the legislature
is driven by political pressure rather than welfare maximization. In addition,
the authors use data from the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) to show
that voluntary reductions in toxic chemical emissions were greater in states with
larger numbers of environmental activists per capita. This ﬁnding supports the
hypothesis that industry self-regulation is driven by regulatory threats. Khanna
and Quimio (2002) present a behavioral model of ﬁrm decisionmaking, which
they use to develop a set of econometrically testable hypotheses. They ﬁnd
that the threat of environmental liabilities and penalties for non-compliance
with mandatory regulations are signiﬁcant drivers for companies to improve
their environmental management systems.
Negotiated Agreements Segerson and Miceli (1998) present a model in
which environmental legislation will be passed with exogenous probability p un-
less the regulator preempts the legislation by negotiating a VA with industry.
Both industry and the regulator are assumed to face lower costs under a volun-
tary agreement, and the equilibrium of the game is for the regulator to oﬀer a
voluntary agreement and for industry to accept. Depending on the parameters
of the problem, the voluntary agreement may or may not embody the ﬁrst-best
level of abatement. Hansen (1999) presents a model in which a pro-industry
regulator may propose a weak VA that preempts tougher and more socially
desirable regulations. He also considers the possibility that weak VAs emerge
because both the regulator and the legislature have incentives to avoid the ex
post criticism of interest groups. Glachant (2003) develops a model of negoti-
ated agreements in which the probability of mandatory regulations a product
of interest group pressures, which can be preempted if a voluntary agreement
is negotiated. He shows that negotiated agreements, while socially beneﬁcial,
tend to be relatively weak in terms of environmental protection, and that it may
be socially desirable for the negotiation with industry to be conducted directly
by environmental groups instead of by the regulator.
Public Voluntary Agreements Carraro and Siniscalco (1996) present a
model in which a regulator designs a voluntary agreement that oﬀers a subsidy
to a ﬁrm that agrees to adopt an environmentally friendly technology.5 As is
typical for mechanism design models, the regulator oﬀers a menu of contracts,
diﬀerentiated by the level of subsidy involved and the investment expected of
the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm can then select among the contracts depending upon its
cost of environmental innovation. Although the authors do not distinguish be-
tween negotiated agreements and public voluntary agreements, we view their
contribution as best suited to the analysis of the latter category.
Lyon and Maxwell (forthcoming a) present a model that incorporates both
industry self-regulation and public voluntary agreements. If self-regulation
5Unlike the other papers discussed in this section, Carraro and Sinscalco (1996) allow for
incomplete information on the part of the regulator.
3does not preempt regulatory action, then the regulator chooses between oﬀering
a public voluntary agreement (PVA) or proposing an environmental tax to the
legislature. The paper shows that the PVA is typically a weaker alternative to
environmental taxation unless industry political resistance to a tax is strong. In
addition, it shows that industry self-regulation, if it occurs, is welfare-enhancing
in this setting.
This chapter presents a policy-oriented application of the model of Lyon and
Maxwell (forthcoming a) to climate change, with particular reference to the
policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations. In the interest of simplicity,
this chapter ignores the role of self-regulation, which in our view is not playing
a preemptive role in the climate change debate.
3 Model Overview
In this section we lay out a two-stage game of climate change policy played by a
regulator and the ﬁrms in an industry.6 The heart of the game is the regulator’s
choice between creating a public voluntary agreement (PVA) or proposing an en-
vironmental tax to the legislature, a choice based on the regulator’s expectations
about the political and market responses of industry to the two alternatives. We
will not present the technical aspects of the analysis, but will describe our as-
sumptions and the structure of the model in enough detail that the reader can
understand how we reach our conclusions. We couch our discussion in terms
of a carbon tax, but with the recognition that our analysis would apply equally
well to a cap and trade system, which would generate a market price for green-
house gases that would have the same eﬀects on the market as would a carbon
tax. As we proceed through the analysis of the model, we highlight our primary
conclusions in the form of a series of italicized and numbered Remarks.
In stage 1 of the game, the regulator decides whether to propose a carbon
tax, and sets its level, τ. In stage 2, if the regulator chooses not to propose
a tax, or if the proposed tax is not passed by the legislature, the regulator
may propose a public voluntary agreement involving a subsidy s, paid for by
raising costly public funds.We purposely do not assume that voluntary actions
are cheaper than actions mandated by law, as doing so would make it too easy
to reach simplistic conclusions about the superiority of voluntary measures. We
also assume away the possibility of “win-win” solutions in which the adoption of
environmentally-friendly technology lowers cost; economic analysis is not needed
to conclude that these actions are desirable, nor are subsidies required to induce
adoption.
The basic set up of our model is based on Lewis (1996). The industry con-
sists of a group of domestic manufacturing plants that supply an export product
that sells at a ﬁxed world price.7 Plants diﬀer according to their eﬃciency (and
6For technical details, see Lyon and Maxwell (forthcoming a). For a broader perspective
on corporate environmentalism, see Lyon and Maxwell (forthcoming b)
7By assuming a competitive global market we leave out consideration of “green consumers.”
While this is clearly an interesting issue, we eschew it in order to keep our model tractable and
4hence proﬁtability), and also in their costs of adopting an environmental tech-
nology, which is assumed to eliminate all environmental costs associated with
production. Eﬃcient plants have higher proﬁts due to lower costs, and their
higher eﬃciency also translates into lower costs of adopting the new technology.
This is consistent with the observation that ﬁrms undertaking voluntary actions
are typically the larger, more proﬁtable members of an industry.8
Each plant in operation emits pollutants that impose an external cost on
domestic consumers. The net social welfare generated by a given plant is equal to
the plant’s economic proﬁts minus the environmental costs it imposes on society.
We assume that some plants currently in operation are actually creating negative
net beneﬁts for society; in other words, the environmental damage they cause
is greater than the proﬁts they generate. From the perspective of overall social
welfare, such plants should be shut down. In the context of climate change,
these plants are likely to be older facilities combusting high sulfur coal.
If the regulator had a free hand, and was unconstrained by political con-
siderations, it could induce dirty, ineﬃcient plants to shut down by imposing a
carbon tax τ set equal to the social cost of pollution. (The cost of proposing
and implementing the tax is assumed to be a ﬁxed amount K.) Any plant
that could adopt the pollution control technology at a cost less than the tax
w o u l dd os oa n da v o i dp a y i n gt h et a x . F i r m s ,h o w e v e r ,h a v eas t r o n gi n c e n t i v e
to oppose any tax, so we make the realistic assumption that the chances of a
tax bill passing through the legislature diminish the larger are the costs the bill
would impose upon industry.
In the absence of a tax, the regulator may propose a public voluntary agree-
ment to encourage the adoption of the environmental technology. We assume
the cost K of implementing the voluntary agreement is the same as the cost of
implementing the tax, so as not to have our results hinge on exogenous diﬀer-
ences in the cost of the two programs. We follow Carraro and Siniscalco (1996)
in modeling the public voluntary agreement as a subsidy, s, set optimally by the
regulator, which is payable to any plant that adopts the environmental technol-
ogy. Note that a public VA is a specialized form of subsidy, which can only be
collected by plants that stay in business and participate in the VA program.
We assume the subsidies paid by the regulatory authorities involve costly
public funds. In addition, we assume plants that adopted the environmental
technology before the public voluntary agreement was established cannot be
excluded from receiving the beneﬁts of participating in the voluntary agree-
ment, an assumption that is consistent with government practice in the public
voluntary programs we discuss in section 5.9
because green consumers are arguably fairly unimportant in many markets, especially those
for intermediate products. As Lyon and Maxwell (2000) discuss, the empirical support for the
notion that green consumerism drives corporate environmental eﬀorts is mixed at best.
8Alcoa, for example, participates in the EPA’s Climate Leaders program, and has taken
a public stance in favor of a mandatory climate change policy, based in part on its own
superior ability to achieve energy eﬃciency, according to Randy Overbey, President, Energy
Division, Alcoa, in remarks at the World Resources Institute Sustainable Enterprise Summit,
Washington, DC, March 13, 2003.
9For example, in the area of climate change, leading ﬁrms that have already begun reducing
54 The Regulator’s Choice between Taxation and
aV A
In this section, we focus on the regulator’s expected welfare when it proposes an
environmental tax and when it proposes a public voluntary agreement (VA). We
work backward through the game, beginning with the stage 2 decision regarding
whether to oﬀer a VA, then turning to the stage 1 decision regarding taxation.
Stage 2: The Public Voluntary Agreement
If there is no legislation, the regulator may incur a ﬁxed cost K and create
a public voluntary agreement consisting of a positive subsidy s,p a y a b l et o
plants that adopt the environmental technology. The level of the subsidy is
chosen to maximize social welfare. Since the regulator cannot identify the
cost of an individual plant, it must set a single subsidy level that applies to
all plants. Plants can then be divided into two groups, those that choose to
join the PVA program and adopt the environmental technology, and those that
do not. Overall social welfare sums up the net contributions of both groups
(proﬁts minus environmental damages), and subtracts the cost of raising funds
to cover the aggregate subsidy payments made.
If public funds were not costly, the optimal subsidy would simply be equal
to the environmental harm done by each plant. This is an intuitively appeal-
ing criterion for setting the subsidy level, as it ensures that all plants that can
adopt the technology at a cost less than their environmental damages will do
so. When public funds are costly, however, the optimal subsidy is distorted
downwards, and too few plants will adopt the environmental technology, rela-
tive to the case of costless public funds. At the margin, the regulator faces a
tradeoﬀ between inducing additional participation in the program and paying
out additional subsidies to plants that would participate in the program anyway.
When the participation rate is unresponsive to increases in the subsidy, and
public funds are costly, it becomes very burdensome to raise the level of partic-
ipation in the program, and the distortion in the subsidy grows. Typically, the
industry’s responsiveness to subsidy increases is dampened as the heterogeneity
in plant adoption costs grows larger, so it becomes increasingly costly to induce
additional plants to participate in a voluntary program as industry heterogene-
ity grows. Overall, social welfare under a VA increases when the cost of public
funds is low and the cost of technology adoption does not vary greatly across
plants.10
Stage 1: Proposal of an Environmental Tax
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the regulator may propose an environmental
tax τ which can be implemented at a cost K. It is easy to see that any tax
proposal will result in losses to the industry. As a result, industry will oppose
even a ﬁrst-best tax, and the optimal tax proposed by the regulator will be
carbon dioxide emissions hope to acquire “early reduction credits" that they can trade in for
emissions credits if and when a mandatory system is put in place.
10In addition, of course, the net social beneﬁts of the VA must exceed the cost of creating
the program. We will assume this condition holds throughout the remainder of this section,
s i n c eo t h e r w i s eaV Aw o u l dn e v e rb eo ﬀered.
6distorted away from its ﬁrst-best level. For clarity of exposition, we start our
analysis with the case where there is no political opposition, and then move on
to study the regulator’s behavior when tax proposals face political resistance.
Absent any political opposition, and if public funds were not costly, then
the optimal tax would simply be equal to the environmental harm done by each
plant. This is an intuitively appealing criterion, as it ensures that all plants that
can adopt the technology at a cost less than the environmental damages they
cause will do so. When public funds are costly, however, matters become more
complicated. In this case, the regulator faces a tradeoﬀ between two eﬀects.
On one hand, there is an incentive to expand the tax base, by reducing the tax
level a bit so as to increase the number of plants that are paying the tax. On
the other hand, there is an incentive to increase the tax revenues raised from
the existing tax base, by raising the tax level. Which of these eﬀects dominates
depends on how much the tax base responds to a small decrease in the tax rate.
Thus, the tax that is ultimately imposed may either be above or below the level
of environmental damages.
The welfare gains from taxation, relative to government inaction, come in
three parts. First, there are social gains from forcing ineﬃcient plants to exit
the industry, since the proﬁts these plants generate are less than the environ-
mental damage they cause. Second is the social value of the tax revenues raised
from the emissions tax, which can oﬀset the need to raise public funds through
other means. Third are the social gains from adoptions of the environmental
technology by eﬃcient plants.
We have seen that even when political opposition is not an issue, both the
VA and the tax are distorted by the need to cope with the cost of raising
public funds. In the following remark we highlight the relative performance of
the two instruments, still maintaining the assumption that there is no political
resistance.
Remark 1 When regulators do not face political opposition from industry, the
optimal pollution tax generates greater social beneﬁts than does the optimal pub-
lic voluntary agreement.
Remark 1 states that the tax is inherently a more powerful instrument than
the VA. There are two reasons for this. First, a fundamental limitation of the
VA is that it cannot subsidize plants to exit the industry; plants must stay in
business in order to collect any beneﬁts from the VA program. Thus, a VA
should not be confused with an optimal subsidy program, which would actually
subsidize some plants to exit the industry. Second, in a world with costly
public funds, a tax that generates public revenues is preferable to a subsidy
that drains public coﬀers. Both eﬀects make a tax preferable to a VA program
when political pressures are ignored.
In reality, of course, political opposition is important. Industry losses from
a tax occur in several diﬀerent forms. Ineﬃcient plants exit the industry and
their proﬁts are lost. Moderately eﬃcient plants will continue operations, but
each plant will incur losses equal to the tax. Eﬃcient plants will be induced to
7adopt the environmental technology, which is costly. The sum of these losses
constitutes the total direct costs borne by industry from the tax proposal. How-
ever, additional indirect costs are possible due to the loss of potential subsidies
from a public voluntary agreement. These opportunity costs of a tax must also
be taken into account.
Since industry losses are positive for any positive tax, industry can always
be expected to oppose a tax . This fact alters the regulator’s objective function.
Speciﬁcally, the regulator will optimize the expected beneﬁts of the tax, given
that legislation favoring the tax will only pass with some probability less than
one. As one might expect, with political resistance the regulator weakens the
tax, relative to its socially optimal level, so as to increase its chances of passage.
Remark 2 Industry’s political resistance to tax proposals causes the regulator
to weaken its tax proposal.
We have shown that both the VA and the tax depart from the marginal
social cost of pollution due to the distortionary eﬀects of raising tax monies
and/or political resistance to taxation. Whether the tax produces better results
than the VA in practice, then, depends upon a number of parameters. The key
parameters aﬀecting each of these instruments have been discussed above. In
particular, welfare under a public voluntary agreement improves when the cost
of public funds is low and the cost of adoption is low and does not vary greatly
across plants. At the same time, welfare under a pollution tax improves when
political resistance is not very responsive to increases in tax proposals. Overall,
the most important factor in the relative performance of the two mechanisms is
the level of political opposition.
Remark 3 Taxation is a preferable regulatory instrument to a public voluntary
agreement unless political opposition is high.
Because taxation works at both the upper and lower end of the eﬃciency
distribution of plants, and bolsters rather than drains public coﬀers, it is inher-
ently a more powerful instrument than a public VA. As a result, it is preferred
to a VA unless the political forces opposing taxation are strong. Indeed, the
only reason the regulator might not propose a tax is that making the proposal
requires a ﬁxed cost of K, which is not justiﬁed if the probability of success is
too small.
As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, public voluntary programs–
despite their inherent weaknesses–are becoming more popular. It is interest-
ing, therefore, to examine how welfare is aﬀected when the regulator has the
possibility of oﬀering a public VA after legislative eﬀorts fail.
Remark 4 If political resistance is highly responsive to increases in the pro-
posed tax, then social welfare may be lower when the regulator has the option of
oﬀering a public VA.
The intuition behind Remark 4 is simple: if plant owners know a VA will be
oﬀered after a tax fails, they have more incentive to oppose the tax so they can
8collect the subsidy that is oﬀered under the VA. If political resistance is highly
responsive to changes in the level of the proposed tax, then oﬀering the VA
can produce a signiﬁcant increase in political resistance to the tax, and greatly
reduce the chance that the tax proposal will be passed. If the social beneﬁts of
the tax are substantially greater than the beneﬁts of the VA, then this increased
political resistance dominates the beneﬁts of the VA, and expected welfare is
higher when the possibility of a VA is eliminated. Indeed, Remark 4 shows
it is possible that social welfare would be higher if public VAs had never come
into existence. Whether a legislature could credibly commit not to oﬀer a VA is
questionable, since governments are not known for their commitment abilities.
Nevertheless, our results suggest a cautious approach to the use of public VAs.
5 U.S. Public Voluntary Agreements and Cli-
mate Change
In this section, we apply the insights of the preceding section to analyze the
climate change policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.
These case studies illustrate several of the key points that were developed in
the preceding section. First, public voluntary agreements are often proposed in
the absence of strong legislative threats; indeed, regulatory authorities often use
such agreements precisely because they lack statutory authority to undertake
more stringent measures. Second, companies join public voluntary agreements
in order to obtain the (admittedly modest) beneﬁts oﬀered to participants by the
government. Such agreements can thus be viewed as subsidies from government
to ﬁrms, aimed at inducing environmentally-friendly actions by the participating
ﬁrms. Third, public voluntary programs are generally weak tools adopted when
the political will to take stronger action is missing.
5.1 Public Voluntary Agreements in the Clinton Admin-
stration
After President Clinton was elected in November of 1992, one of his early actions
was to announce support for stronger measures to prevent climate change. In
the early months of 1993, his administration ﬂoated a variety of proposals to
tax energy, including a carbon tax and a broader-based “BTU tax” based on
the energy content of fuels as measured in British Thermal Units. The political
resistance was fast and powerful, and by June the administration decided to
abandon its eﬀorts at passing the tax. When the Administration presented its
C l i m a t eC h a n g eA c t i o nP l a n( C C A P )l a t e ri nt h ey e a r ,t h ef o c u sw a ss h i f t e d
away from mandatory regulations to subsidies (including $200 million per year
to stimulate the adoption of more energy-eﬃcient technologies) and voluntary
programs.
The CCAP spawned many public voluntary programs including Green Lights,
Climate Wise, Motor Challenge and Energy Star Buildings among many oth-
9ers.11 Most of the climate change VAs aim to increase investments in energy
eﬃciency. Energy eﬃciency has been supported by the US government, through
a variety of programs, since the 1970s. Most of these emphasize the private
beneﬁts to ﬁrms and individuals of adopting energy eﬃcient equipment, and
attempt to solve the “market failures”–often thought to be rooted in a lack of
information–that limit the spread of these technologies.
The motivations for companies to participate in public voluntary agreements
are explored by International Academy of the Environment (1998) in a case
study of U.S. corporation Johnson and Johnson’s decisions to participate in
several of the CCAP’s public voluntary agreements, including each of those
mentioned above. The report clearly indicates that the chief factors motivating
Johnson and Johnson were the programs’ implicit subsidies to participants,
including free access to case studies of energy eﬃciency successes and subsidized
access to outside consulting ﬁrms.
In most cases, there does not appear to have been a substantial regulatory
“threat” driving the adoption of VAs. In our conversations with current and
former EPA oﬃcials, none mentioned such threats as important to the creation
of VAs, while all pointed out that VAs were typically used by EPA when the
agency had no statutory authority to take formal regulatory actions. Indeed,
the ﬁrst Bush Administration publicly opposed strong actions to combat global
warming; since that time, the U.S. Congress has shown no interest in accepting
the terms of the Kyoto Protocol.
5.2 Early Reduction Credits for Greenhouse Gases
Shortly after taking oﬃce, President George W. Bush reversed his campaign
pledge to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs), and instead emphasized voluntary
programs for their reduction. Among these is the Department of Energy’s
(DOE’s) program for the voluntary reporting of greenhouse gases. The Ad-
ministration is developing a policy to induce voluntary reductions of GHGs by
granting early reduction credits that can be used against any future regulatory
requirements. Kennedy (forthcoming) uses a stylized model to analyze the in-
centives created under a credit for early action (CEA) program. He points out
(p. 16) that such a program “provides a subsidy for early emission reductions,
where the subsidy is paid in terms of valuable credits against future emissions.
This means that the CEA program is subject to the same textbook problem
that plagues all subsidies: the distortion of non-marginal incentives." Thus,
the CEA program, in its general outlines, can be understood in terms of the
m o d e lw eh a v ep r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e r .
Four stakeholder group meetings will be held around the country to gather
input from concerned parties. The ﬁrst of these was held in Washington, DC,
in November of 2002. The content of the discussion at this ﬁrst meeting illumi-
nates some of the challenges that face this voluntary program: transaction costs
11For details on these and the other programs introduced under the CCAP, see U.S. Oﬃce
of Global Change (1997).
10are likely to be high, measurement will be diﬃcult, opportunities for industry
manipulation of the scheme are signiﬁcant, and actions taken in developing the
voluntary plan may constrain the development of mandatory programs in the
future.
The transaction costs of an early reduction program are likely to be high
relative to those of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program. With either of
these latter instruments, price signals can work their way through the economy,
providing a direct incentive for end-users to conserve on their use of electricity or
gasoline. With the voluntary program, it becomes necessary to construct both
“direct“ and “indirect“ reductions systems, where indirect reductions come from
end-users and direct reductions come from producers of electricity or oil. This
can create a tension between producers and consumers, since producers have
incentives to oppose indirect reductions, as they would lead to lower sales.
The use of a voluntary program also makes it necessary to construct base-
lines against which to measure reductions, for both producers and consumers.
Baselines for consumers may have to be conditioned on underlying determinants
of demand. For example, energy consumers might be able to claim credit if
their energy use in a cold year was held to the same level as in the previous,
warmer, year. Baselines for producers must be measured in terms of units of
GHG per unit output, where output measures will diﬀer across producers of
diﬀerent products, making aggregation diﬃcult.
Given the importance of deﬁning baselines, there is considerable room for
the manipulation of starting dates and levels. plants that have undertaken
recent self-regulatory actions will prefer to deﬁne the start date of the program
as occurring prior to these actions, in order to claim credit for them. Diﬀerent
plants will prefer diﬀerent baseline dates, and the easiest way to achieve consen-
sus will be to agree on the earliest date proposed by any of the parties. Yet the
further back in time the baseline goes, the less meaningful are any reductions
claimed by the program.12
Finally, the measurement and aggregation methods adopted under the vol-
untary program will tend to shape the development of any future mandatory
climate change program. Some environmental groups fear that the issuance of
early reduction credits will create a political tendency to inﬂate the total number
of emissions allowances ultimately oﬀered under any mandatory cap-and-trade
plan. Parry and Toman (forthcoming) poin to u tt h a ti fe a r l yr e d u c t i o nc r e d i t s
are given out for free, they will “crowd out” revenues that might accrue from
future auctions of emissions permits. Kennedy (forthcoming) argues that early
reduction credits may distort plants’ decisions about how to prepare for future
regulations, inducing a focus on achieving quick reductions through capital in-
vestment rather than potentially more eﬀective research into ways to reduce
future compliance costs.
The example of voluntary GHG reductions supports our basic analysis: vol-
untary programs are weak, subsidy-based programs that are implemented when
12Parry and Toman (forthcoming) and Kennedy (forthcoming) emphasize the adverse selec-
tion problem created when ﬁrms receive credit for emission reductions relative to a baseline
about which they have private information.
11more powerful mandatory programs are politically infeasible. Furthermore,
if ﬁrms expect a voluntary program should regulatory proposals fail to pass,
then their incentives for rent-seeking behavior are enhanced and the chances for
passage of regulatory proposals are reduced.
Early reduction credits also raise some interesting points that go beyond our
model, however. First, it may be important to bear in mind the transaction
costs created under voluntary programs relative to those under mandatory pro-
grams. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, it appears that mandatory programs
may have substantial advantages in this regard. In particular, mandatory pro-
grams may be able to make use of the price system to transmit incentives, while
voluntary programs must rely on more complicated measurement and reporting
procedures. Second, voluntary and mandatory programs may diﬀer in their sus-
ceptibility to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. A case in point is
the adverse selection problem associated with deﬁning a baseline against which
emissions reductions are to be measured. Third, the subsidy associated with
such credits is only paid if a mandatory program is subsequently imposed, which
suggests that it may be worthwhile to develop a model tailored speciﬁcally to
this aspect of the program. All of these points suggest interesting issues for
future research.
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
We have presented a model of environmentally-friendly technology adoption in
which public voluntary agreements (VAs) and legislatively-imposed taxes (ei-
ther of the Pigouvian sort or the sort created implicitly through an emissions
trading program) can be compared. Our analysis in this chapter is somewhat
at odds with the conventional view of public VAs, which sees them as a more
eﬃcient instrument than traditional approaches to pollution control, and hence
something to be encouraged. We do not deny that this is possible in some cir-
cumstances, but we emphasize that it is not a general conclusion. Previous work
has often failed to distinguish carefully between unilateral and public voluntary
agreements, and thus may reach misleading policy conclusions. In particular,
it is often thought that voluntary agreements emerge only under pressure of
strong legislative threats, and that public voluntary programs should be pro-
moted as eﬃcient alternatives that are superior to politically unpopular taxes
and inﬂexible standards. Our analysis reaches very diﬀerent conclusions: public
voluntary programs are often weak instruments that are used precisely because
strong legislation is infeasible due to industry’s political resistance. We argue
that this view aptly characterizes the most numerous group of public voluntary
programs in the US, namely those developed by the EPA for issues of global
warming. Furthermore, we show that the option of oﬀering public VAs may re-
duce welfare by strengthening industry resistance to more stringent regulatory
or taxation schemes.
The most important lesson of this chapter is that public VAs typically arise
from weakness, not from strength. They should not be regarded as some new
12and superior policy instrument. Rather, they should be viewed as a limited
tool that may be useful in settings where more powerful policy instruments are
infeasible. Indeed, policymakers should approach VAs with caution, since their
very availability may increase industry resistance to the use of more power-
ful regulatory tools. This resistance increases because the hope of obtaining
a subsidy (through a public VA) strengthens industry’s resolve to ﬁght tradi-
tional regulatory tools of taxes and standards, which impose direct costs on the
industry.13
We have illustrated our analysis using the Clinton Administration’s Climate
Change Action Program and the Bush Administration’s Voluntary Reporting
of Greenhouse Gases Program. Both are consistent with the political economic
argument we make here. The latter program also points out the importance of
incorporating transaction costs and adverse selection concerns in future models
of voluntary programs. While most prior studies have argued that voluntary
programs economize on lobbying and transaction costs, the early credits pro-
gram appears to generate greater transaction costs than would a mandatory
program that made use of the price system to deliver incentives.
Finally, the linkage between voluntary and mandatory programs in the case
of early reduction credits raises interesting issues about the optimal design of
a voluntary program as a possible transitional mechanism to a mandatory pro-
gram. A more generous voluntary program may reduce political resistance to
a future mandatory program, but possibly at the cost of weakening or delaying
the mandatory program. Theoretical work on this topic is likely to provide
interesting new insights.
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